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Abstract  
The UN based framework for international drug control, what has been usefully described as 
the global drug prohibition regime, has since its creation displayed some capacity to evolve.  
This is the case both in terms of formal structures and accompanying norms.  Recent moves 
by at present a small number of jurisdictions towards the legal regulation of cannabis for non-
medical and non-scientific purposes has, however, highlighted the existence of systemic 
inertia in the face of unprecedented challenge.  The adoption of a policy choice that operates 
outside the boundaries of the extant international legal architecture has brought into focus 
structural limits in the regime’s capacity to respond to changes in circumstances and the 
requirements of some of its members.  The resultant obstacles and accompanying recourse by 
states to creative legal argumentation contrasts with approaches found within the regime for 
environmental regulation and its underpinning Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs).  In this case a variety of structures and bodies characterise a more dynamic and 
responsive framework. It is argued here that while we should be alert to issue area specificity, 
much can be learned from MEAs and their approach the regime evolution, particularly in 
relation to governance structures and the use of Conferences of the Parties. Seeking lessons  
from other regimes takes on more significance as regime members diverge in their approach 
to addressing the ‘world drug problem.’ 
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1. Introduction  
Effective international regimes are not static constructs. While there remains definitional 
variation concerning exactly what constitutes a regime – a situation that exists not only across 
but also within the increasingly synergistic disciplines of International Relations (IR) and 
International Law (IL)1 -  there is general agreement that they operate in terms of ‘lifecycles’2 
                                                 
1 Simone Schiele, Evolution of International Environmental Regimes: The Case of Climate Change, (2014), pp. 
54-7 and Shirley V. Scott, International Law in World Politics, (3rd ed. 2017), pp. 149-51. On the links between 
the two disciplines see David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Helene Lambert, International Law and 
International Relations, (2012) and Jeffrey. L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relation: The State of the Art, (2013).  
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and consequently ‘tend to change more or less profoundly during their lifetime.’3 Still an area 
of relatively limited study, the concept of regime evolution takes on increasing salience in 
light of a significant expansion in the number of international legal instruments in operation 
today. As the International Law Commission noted in 2006, ‘the volume of multilateral - 
“legislative” – treaty activity has grown manifold in the past fifty years.’4 Furthermore, such 
expansion has been accompanied by an increase in ‘the scope of topics and subjects 
addressed by treaty law,’ with treaty growth being ‘especially marked in economic affairs, as 
well as in the areas of human welfare and the environment.’5   
Although various processes and degrees of regime evolution can be observed across all three 
categories, this article focuses on examples from the fields of human welfare (broadly 
defined) and the environment; more specifically the treaty regime based upon the United 
Nations (UN) drug control conventions and the regime for environmental regulation and its 
underpinning Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). With a basis in comparative 
analysis, our aim here is to contribute to the understanding of why – relative to a dynamic 
regime like that dealing with transnational environmental concerns – what has been usefully 
called the ‘global drug prohibition regime’6 (GDPR) appears to possess limited evolutionary 
capacity in the face of changing circumstances and requirements of some regime members.  
As a common characteristic of most regimes, tensions within the GDPR among states 
themselves as well as between states and monitoring bodies is not new.7 Nonetheless, recent 
shifts in the way that a still small but growing number of jurisdictions are choosing to deal 
with the illicit use of cannabis within their territories has arguably brought the GDPR to a 
point of unprecedented crisis. The introduction of regulated markets for the non-medical and 
non-scientific use of cannabis at national and sub-national levels has been fervently criticised 
by the Vienna-based body responsible for monitoring states’ implementation of the treaties. 
For the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB or Board) such policies clearly operate 
beyond the confines of international law.8 Moreover, the policy approach has been 
condemned by a range of states that favour the prohibition-oriented approach privileged by 
the regime and – not unreasonably – view regulated cannabis markets as a profound threat to 
regime integrity.9  Though the notion of a ‘Vienna Consensus’ on drugs has arguably never 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 From the perspective of IL, see for example, Panos Merkouris, The Political Economy of International 
Treaties (2014) p. 3.  Regarding IR see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 52, 4 “International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change”, 52, 4 International Organization, (1998) pp. 887-917 and Wayne Sandholtz 
and Kendall W. Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change, (2008) 
3 Thomas Gehring and Sebastain Oberthür, “Expanding Regime Interaction” in A. Underdal and O. Young 
(eds.), Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies (2004), pp. 251 
4 United Nations General Assembly, International Law Commission, Fifty-Eighth session, Geneva, 1 May – 9 
June and 3 July – 11 August 2006, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, p.10  
5 Beth. A. Simmons and Richard. H. Steinberg (eds.), International Law and International Relations, (2006), p. 
xxx 
6 Ethan. A. Nadelmann, “Global prohibition regimes; the evolution of norms in international society”, 44, 4 
International Organisation (1990) pp. 479-526 
7 David. R. Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured, (2012) 
 
8 See International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2017 
(2018), pp. 35-6 and Press Release, UN Information Service, Statement of the President of the INCB, Raymond 
Yans (2013) < http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2013/unisnar1173.html>  
9 International Drug Policy Consortium, The 2017 Commission on Narcotic Drugs.  Report of Proceedings 
(2017), pp. 11-12 < http://fileserver.idpc.net/library/CND-Proceedings-Report-2017_ENGLISH.pdf>  and 
International Drug Policy Consortium, The 2016 Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its Special Segment on 
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borne serious scrutiny, the current and apparently growing dissensus around cannabis takes 
the regime into unknown and uncertain territory.  There is much to be said for the view of 
Bennett and Walsh: ‘No treaty can survive the collapse of political consensus supporting it.  
And no treaty system can endure if it cannot cope with changing political conditions.  
Sustainability in international law depends not only on commitment but also on resilience and 
adaptability’ (original emphasis).10 With legally regulated recreational cannabis markets 
already operating in Uruguay and at the sub-national level, the United States, poised for roll 
out in Canada and under serious discussion in a range of disparate states including the 
Netherlands, Jamaica and New Zealand, political conditions are certainly changing.  
We are not the first to note the role of inertia in stymying regime adaptability.11  The original 
contribution of this article, however, lies in its detailed examination of processes and 
mechanisms of ‘change’ within the GDPR and, using a comparative frame, the search for 
possible structural contributions to rigidity and stasis. In so doing, we hope to help move 
current discussions concerning the tensions presently surrounding the operation of the GDPR 
beyond the narrow confines of drug policy analysis and locate them within the broader 
context of IL, IR and wider investigation of regime evolution and modernization in general.   
Additional to the fact that environmental regimes have arguably been the subject of the most 
study on evolution and change,12 the focus on MEAs as a principle comparator to the GDPR 
rests on two factors.  The first of these is the important, although very different, role that the 
advancement of scientific knowledge plays in the lifecycle of both regimes.   The second 
relates to the regimes’ age and the associated structures and mechanisms that come with 
them.  As will be discussed, such factors go some way to help explain why from an IL 
perspective the GDPR has been described as ‘Jurassic’ with its underpinning drug 
conventions ‘so stubbornly resistant to change compared to other treaty systems’ that they 
almost seem ‘“frozen in time.”’13 
Liphardt’s maxim concerning the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’ underpins the methodological 
utility of the comparative approach, or ‘method’, to examine the contrasting regimes and the 
legal instruments of which they comprise.14  While the units of this analysis are examples of 
multilateral conventions and associated bodies rather than nation states, a comparative 
framework still not only forces the recognition of diversity across cases, but also steers us 
towards identification and a degree of explanation. 15 Analysis is framed from the IR 
perspective in terms of regime theory, but we deliberately deploy an approach more in line 
                                                                                                                                                        
Preparations for the UNGASS on the World Drug Problem.  Report of Proceedings (2016), p. 9 < 
http://fileserver.idpc.net/library/CND-proceedings-document-2016_ENGLISH.pdf>  
10 Wells Bennett and John Walsh, Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug 
Treaties (2014), p. 25 <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CEPMMJLegalizationv4.pdf> 
11 See, for example, Neil Boister, “Waltzing on the Vienna Consensus on Drug Control? Tensions in the 
International System for the Control of Drugs,” 29, 2 Leiden Journal of International Law (2016), p. 408-9 and  
Michael Tackeff, “Constructing a Creative Reading: Will US State Cannabis Legislation Threaten the Fate of 
the International Drug Control Treaties, 51 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, (2018), pp. 266-7.   
12 See for example Helmet Breitmeier, Oran. R. Young and Michael M, Zürn, Analysing International 
Environmental Regimes: From Case Study to Database, (2006), Daniel Bodansky and Elliot. Diringer, The 
Evolution of Multilateral Regimes: Implications for Climate Change, (2010) and Schiele, supra note 1) 
13 Heather Hasse, International Law and Drug Policy Reform,   Report of a GDPO/ICHRDP/TNI/WOLA Expert 
Seminar, (2014), pp. 34-5 <http://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/Expert%20Seminar%20Report%20-
%20International%20Law%20&%20Drug%20Policy%20Reform.pdf > 
14 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative politics and the Comparative Method” 65, 3 The American Political Science 
Review (1971), p. 682. 
15 Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, How to Compare Nations, (1990) 
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with the descriptive component of what Levy has referred to as the ‘atheoretical’ or 
‘configurative-idiographic’ than a search for  nomothetic rules. 16   
To help better understand the mechanics of regime evolution, or indeed inertia, the article 
looks to the work of Diehl, Ku and, more recently, Zamora and their exploration of the 
dynamics of international law.  Although not seeking to test their explanatory framework, we 
draw on their organizational approach and the identification of two distinct but inter-
connected aspects of international law and the associated framework for interstate discourse 
and cooperation. These are mechanisms for ‘cross-border interactions’, what they call the 
‘operating system’, and those that ‘shape the values and goals these interactions are 
pursuing’, the ‘normative system.’17 As has been discussed elsewhere, a variety of factors can 
help explain the resilience of the GDPR to substantive change;18 many of which, including  
political dynamics, fit well with the framework offered by Diehl and colleagues. Of particular 
interest here, however, is the potential role of treaty structures and mechanisms in generating 
inertia and instances where the ‘operating system may be more resistant to change and not 
always responsive to alterations in the normative system’;19 a situation that as the case of 
cannabis policy and the GDPR reveals, leads to asynchronous change with the former to 
some extent lagging behind the latter and the changing perspectives of some regime 
members. Beyond content analysis of a range of legal documents and reports, where 
appropriate primary research for the article also draws on material generated from participant 
observation and off-the-record meetings and discussions with government officials within the 
international drug control sphere.20   
The article begins with an overview of the GDPR.  This includes a detailed discussion of 
operating and normative mechanisms, processes and examples of regime ‘change’ and 
transformation as well as their limitations.  It then moves on to a brief overview of a selection 
of MEAs.  Here the focus is the operating system and one of the key structural elements of 
the environmental regime that allow for dynamic change; the existence of a Conference or 
Meeting of the Parties and related legal structures.  These allow for not only regular treaty 
monitoring and review but also the incorporation of far-reaching changes to environmental 
instruments. Examples of these mechanisms and other relevant features are explored 
specifically through structural analysis of aspects of the 1987 Montreal Protocol, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
and the UN European Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Arhus 
Convention).   
The article concludes by confirming the view that in all issue areas successful regimes must 
have the capacity to evolve and modernize, a process vital for the maintenance of regime 
integrity.  When examined alongside MEAs, we suggest that where the GDPR is concerned, 
relative structural homeostasis and an accompanying lack of serious discussion of regime 
                                                 
16 Jack S. Levy, “Qualitative Methods in International Relations”, in F. Harvey (ed) Millennial Reflections on 
International Studies, (2002), p. 435.  
17 Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl, “International Law as Operating and Normative Systems: An Overview,” in 
C. Ku and P.F. Diehl (eds), International Law: Classic and Contemporary Reading, (1998), pp. 31-5, Paul. F. 
Diehl, Charlotte. Ku and Daniel Zamora, “The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of Normative 
and Operating Systems” 57, 1 International Organization (2003) pp. 43-75 and Paul. F. Diehl and Charlotte. 
Ku, The Dynamics of International Law, (2010), p. 2. 
18 David Bewley-Taylor, “Refocusing metrics: can the sustainable development goals help break the ‘metrics’ 
trap and modernise international drug control policy?” 17, 2 Drugs and Alcohol Today (2017), p. 99. 
19 Diehl, Ku and Zamora, supra note 17, p. 48. 
20 Bewley-Taylor has been a member of non-government organization and country delegations to the UN 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs for over ten years. 
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evolution may be in part a result of antiquated operating mechanisms.   Furthermore, it is 
posited that in the absence of viable mechanisms for structural change, states wishing to 
move beyond the confines of the extant regime may need to consider avenues that, while in 
conformity with international law, are more innovative than in issue areas where more 
dynamic legal structures are in place.   
 
2. The global drug prohibition regime 
 
The GDPR is an almost universally accepted treaty-based system currently built on a suite of 
three UN treaties.  These are little known examples of so-called ‘suppression conventions” 
that underpin a range of prohibition regimes in international law.21  Dating back to the first 
decades of the twentieth century, the bedrock of the regime in its current form is the 1961 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended by the 1972 Protocol); one of the many 
multilateral instruments to be agreed during the exceptional period of treaty making  activity 
in the third quarter of the twentieth century (1951-1975).22 As in other issue areas, these 
pieces of hard law are accompanied by periodic soft law instruments (Political Declarations 
and variations thereof), including the outcomes of United Nations General Assembly Special 
Sessions. The conventions are also supported by several treaty bodies and agencies to create 
what is intended to be an internally coherent and mutually reinforcing legal framework.   
The regime’s overarching goal as expressed in the preamble of the Single Convention is to 
safeguard the ‘health and welfare’ of humankind.  In so doing it applies a dual imperative: to 
ensure an adequate supply of pharmaceuticals for the licit market – including World Health 
Organization (WHO) listed essential medicines - and at the same time prevent the non-
scientific and non-medical production, supply and use of narcotic and psychotropic 
substances. Within this context, the system has been developed on two interconnected tenets.  
First, a deeply held belief that the best way to protect health and reduce what has become 
known simply and somewhat vaguely as the ‘world drug problem’ and the harms associated 
with it is to minimize the scale of - and ultimately eliminate - the illicit market. And second, 
that this can be achieved through a reliance on prohibition oriented and supply-side 
dominated measures.23  In this way, and while permitting some deviation from its 
authoritative norm, from an IR perspective the regime has successfully generated a powerful 
prohibitionist expectancy in relation to how its members approach the non-medical and non-
scientific use of substances scheduled in the UN drug control conventions.24   
 
2.1 The GDPR’s (limited) Capacity for Change  
                                                 
21  See Nadelmann, supra note 6, pp. 479-526.  Nadelmann uses the term ‘global prohibition regime’ to describe 
the various regimes that have been developed to prohibit certain activities globally.  On ‘suppression 
conventions’ see Neil Boister, Penal Aspects of the UN Drug Conventions, (2001) p 3 and “Human Rights 
Protections in the Suppression Conventions”, 199, 2 Human Rights Law Review (2002), p. 210. This contrasts 
with a purely historical perspective that focusses on the UN drug control treaties in isolation. See, for example, 
John Collins, “Regulation as Global Drug Governance: How New Is the NPS Phenomenon?”, in O. Corazza, A. 
Roman-Urresstarazu (eds), Novel Psychoactive Substances: Policy, Economics and Drug Regulation, (2017), p. 
25. 
22 Simmons and Steinberg, supra note 5, pp. xxx-xxxi 
23 See ‘General Obligations’ of the Single Convention, Article 4, ‘The parties shall take such legislative and 
administrative measures as may be necessary…(c), ‘Subject to the provisions of this Convention. To limit 
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade 
in, use and possession of drugs.’  




As suggested above, the GDPR certainly has some capacity for change and evolution.  
Viewing treaties as core to any regime’s operating system and ‘an important repository of 
modes or techniques for change’25 several processes can be identified to show how the GDPR 
has changed overtime.  While the course of multilateral drug control is sometimes portrayed 
as ‘a smooth continuum connecting events in the first decade of the twentieth century to the 
present day; an arc of unbroken progress incorporating both soft and hard law instruments 
alike’, a strong case can be made that the Single Convention itself was more than just a 
consolidating treaty.26  Rather, although largely successful in achieving this goal, its passage 
should be regarded as a significant ‘watershed’ event when the ‘multilateral framework 
shifted away from regulation and introduced a more prohibitive ethos to the issue of drug 
control’.27   
Moreover, in codifying into a single instrument most of the pre-1961 ‘foundational treaties’, 
the Convention was originally intended to be the last word in international drug control.28  
Nonetheless, in response to changes in the nature of the illicit drug market in the following 
years, member states – notable amongst them the US – felt it necessary to strengthen and 
expand the UN control framework at various points.  Consequently, as well as itself being 
altered in 1972, the Single Convention was supplemented by the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances.  This was an expansion and evolution of the regime 
paradoxically necessitated by the ineffectiveness of the Single Convention itself.    
From an operating system perspective, it is also important to appreciate not only the capacity 
of the GDPR to expand its purview through the development of new instruments but also the 
availability of structural mechanisms for change within the conventions themselves.  Key 
among these is treaty modification, a process that allows for constant adjustment in the scope 
of the GDPR via the scheduling procedure.  While ‘often viewed as an obscure issue’ 
scheduling ‘lies at the core of the functioning of the international drug control system.’29 
Determinations are based on recommendations from the WHO, or more precisely its Expert 
Committee on Drug Dependence.  These are passed to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND or Commission). A functional Commission of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC or Council), the regime’s Vienna based 53-member central policy making body 
makes decisions on adding, removing or transferring between schedules or conventions 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under international control as laid out in the 
Single Convention and the 1971 Convention. Provisions concerning changes in the ‘scope of 
control’ are contained within articles 3 and 2 of those Conventions respectively.   
Additionally, in line with Article 12 of the 1988 Convention, the Commission, decides on the 
inclusion in, deletion from or transfer between its ‘tables’ ‘Substances frequently used in the 
illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances,’ more commonly referred to 
as pre-cursors.  This decision is made upon recommendations from the INCB. Created under 
the Single Convention and established in 1968, the Board is the product of a merging of two 
much older bodies: The Permanent Central Opium Board, created by the 1925 International 
                                                 
25 Diehl and Ku, supra note 17, p. 2. 
26 See David. Bewley-Taylor and Martin. Jelsma, “Regime change: Revisiting the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs,” 23 International Journal of Drug Policy (2012) pp. 72-81. 
27 Ibid  
28 Ibid, p. 80. 
29  Christopher Hallam, David Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, Scheduling in the international drug control 
system, 25, Transnational Institute-International Drug Policy Consortium, Series on legislative Reform of Drug 
Policies, (2014), p. 1 < https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr25_0.pdf> 
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Opium Convention and the Drug Supervisory Body, created by the 1931 Convention for 
Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotics Drugs.  According to 
its own literature, the INCB is the ‘independent and quasi-judicial expert body’ for 
‘monitoring and supporting Governments’ compliance with the international drug control 
treaties.’30 
At a more substantive level, the drug control treaties also allow for revision through 
amendment; the formal alteration of a convention article or articles.  This option is provided 
for in Article 47 of the Single Convention, Article 30 of the 1971 and Article 31 of the 1988 
Convention. Procedures for amending both the 1961 and 1971 Conventions are almost 
identical.  Parties can at any time notify the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) of a proposal for 
an amendment, including the reasoning behind the move.  The UNSG then communicates the 
proposed amendment and reasons for it to the parties and ECOSOC, which, depending upon 
their responses, decides on how to proceed.  The amendment procedure of the 1988 
Convention differs subtly from its antecedents.  In the first instance, the Council is bypassed 
and the UNSG proceeds on his or her own authority to circulate the proposed amendment and 
the reasoning behind it to the parties to the Convention and asks whether they accept it.31   
It was the use of Article 47 of the Single Convention that began the process leading to the 
Amending Protocol in 1972.  Then, owing much to the energetic endeavours of Washington 
D.C., ECOSOC passed a resolution calling for a plenipotentiary conference to amend the 
Convention32 with US diplomats arguing that it was ‘time for the international community to 
build on the foundation of the Single Convention, since a decade has given a better 
perspective on its strengths and weaknesses.’33 Held in Geneva, the resulting conference was 
sponsored by 31 nations, attended by representatives from 97 states and considered an 
extensive set of amendments. The product of the meeting, the Protocol Amending the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, was signed on 25 March 1972 and came into force in August 
1975.34  Rather than making dramatic changes to the Single Convention, the Amending 
Protocol fine-tuned existing provisions relating to the drug estimates system, data collection 
and output, while also strengthening law enforcement measures and extradition and the 
functioning of the Board.35  Importantly, following provisions within the 1971 Convention, it 
drew attention to the need to provide treatment and alternatives to penal sanctions for drug 
users.   
All that said, while Article 47 facilitated appreciable treaty revision in the early 1970s and 
substances are scheduled and rescheduled on a regular basis, both amendment and 
                                                 
30 <https://www.incb.org/incb/en/index.html> 
31 For a detailed discussion on modification and amendment see David R. Bewley-Taylor, “Challenging the UN 
Drug Control Conventions: Problems and Possibilities”, 14, 2 International Journal of Drug Policy (2003), pp. 
174-6.  
32 ECOSOC resolution 1577, 21 May 1971. Although not mentioned in Article 47, the Council may submit 
proposed amendments to the General Assembly for ‘consideration and possible adoption in accordance with 
Article 62, paragraph 3 of the United Nations.’  Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961, (1973), pp. 462-463 
33 United Nations, ‘Memorandum of the United States of America Respecting its proposed Amendments to the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,’ E/CONF.63/10 in United Nations Conference to Consider 
Amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (Geneva 6 – 24 March 1972): Official Records, 
vol. 1 (1974), pp. 3-4 cited in M. Jelsma, “UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide 
Coherence on Drug Policy”, Journal of Drug Policy Analysis (2016)  
34 See Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, supra note 28, pp. 78-79.  For a detailed account of the protocol see Nelson 
G. Gross and G. J. Greenwald, “The 1972 narcotics protocol,” 2 Contemporary Drug Problems (1973) pp. 119-
163  
35 Neil Boister, Penal Aspects of the UN Drug Conventions (2001), pp. 47-48. 
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modification of all three conventions are highly susceptible to blocking action of states 
wishing, for whatever reason, to preserve the existing shape of the regime. This is a situation  
that as Deihl, Ku and Zamora demonstrate in relation to the role of ‘leading states’, is not 
unique to this issue area.36   
In terms of alteration of schedules, and with its origins dating back to the 1931 Convention,37 
the Single Convention requires a simple majority of CND member states.  For the 1971 
Convention a decision of two-thirds is required.  Both treaties also include a facility whereby 
the request of one Party can trigger the appeal of a scheduling decision to the Council, whose 
majority-based verdict is final.38  Although the Board rather than WHO takes the lead in the 
modification process, similar issues pertain regarding the 1988 Convention.  Like the 1971 
Convention, the Commission’s decision must be carried with a two-thirds majority and again 
any Party can initiate a review of the CND’s decision by the Council.  As with the earlier 
Conventions, ECOSOC may confirm, alter, or reverse the decision of the Commission.  
Similarly, procedures within all three treaties allow even limited opposition to a proposed 
amendment to thwart the initiative. For both the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, if no Party 
rejects the amendment within 18 months after circulation ‘it shall thereupon enter into force.’  
(Article 47 (2) and Article 30 (2) respectively). However, if a proposed amendment is 
rejected by one or more parties the Council may follow suit in ‘response to objections and the 
substantial arguments provided’39 or decide whether a conference should be called to 
consider the amendment.  As well as operating on a more generous timetable, provisions 
within the 1988 Convention differ somewhat in other respects.  According to Article 31 (1), if 
a proposed and circulated amendment has not been rejected by any party within 24 months, 
‘it shall be deemed to have been accepted and shall enter into force in respect of a Party…’  
However, moving away from ‘tacit approval’ within the earlier treaties,40 this comes into 
effect ninety days after ‘that party has deposited with the Secretary General an instrument 
expressing its consent to be bound by that amendment.’ In this case, if the proposed 
amendment is rejected by any party, the UNSG must consult with the parties and ‘if a 
majority so requests, bring the matter to the Council which may decide to call a conference.’ 
(Article 31 (2)).   
The origins of the provisions for amendment within the current UN conventions appear to 
stem from articles concerning ‘revisions’ in the 1931 Convention and the 1936 Convention 
for the Suppression of the illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, the only foundational treaties to 
contain such mechanisms.41 The approach may also have been influenced by Article 22 of the 
1953 Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the poppy Plant, the Production 
of, International Whole Trade in and Use of Opium.42 This was a treaty that came into force 
                                                 
36 Diehl, Ku and Zamora, supra note 17, p. 60. 
37 Hallam, Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, supra note 31, p. 3.   
38 Ibid  
39 International Drug Policy Consortium Advocacy Note, Correcting a historical error: IDPC calls on countries 
to abstain from submitting objections to the Bolivian proposal to remove ban on the chewing of the coca leaf, 
(2011) < https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/idpc_advocacy_note_-
_support_bolivia_proposal_on_coca_leaf.pdf >  
40 Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988. Done at Vienna on 20 December 1988, (1998) pp. 412-13.  
41 Article 33, 1931 Convention for the Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs, (as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success, 1947) and Article 25 of the 1936 Convention for 
the Suppression of the illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success, 
1947) <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/Temp/1999/01/13/Ch_VI_7p.pdf>    
42 Article 22 <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1963/03/19630308%2002-01%20AM/Ch_VI_14p.pdf > 
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in 1962 only to be superseded by the 1961 instrument in 1964.43 Although the thresholds and 
bodies involved in the pre-UN treaties differ to those within the existing regime, the option of 
convening all the parties to discuss proposed amendments is complicated relative to more 
recent instruments in other issue areas, including MEAs.  This is the case in spite of efforts at 
the 1961 plenipotentiary conference to reduce the complexity of the process contained in 
early drafts of the Single Convention.  As a reading of the travaux reveals, discussions 
around the amendment procedures focused on keeping the process of whether to convene a 
conference to consider amendments as simple as possible with the outcome leaving much 
discretion with ECOSOC.44 
As such, despite some differences in approach for both modification and amendment, the 
result is essentially the same.  Formal mechanisms for revision exist within all the treaty texts 
and consequently generate the impression of evolutionary capacity. Yet, in reality substantive  
change is difficult to achieve. On this point, it is worth recalling a message within the first 
edition of the World Drug Report in 1997.  Then the United Nations International Drug 
Control Programme, forerunner of the current UN agency responsible for coordinating 
international drug control activities, the United Nations Office on Drugs (UNODC), noted 
that ‘Laws – even the international Conventions – are not written in stone; they can be 
changed when the democratic will of nations so wishes it.’45 With regard to amendment in 
particular, while remarkably progressive for a UN document, sentiment within the 
publication belies the daunting political and procedural obstacles confronting any member 
state or states wishing to initiate a formal change of the current regime.  This is particularly 
so during the current era when, unlike the early 1970s, there is significant divergence in the 
way regime members are choosing to deal with substances deemed illicit for anything other 
than medical and scientific purposes. Further complicating the situation is the often-
contradictory approach to protecting regime integrity deployed by parties who are themselves 
deviating in one way or another from the regime’s authoritative norm; a point to which we 
will return.  
Indeed, while as in other issue area regimes norms are important in the overall functioning of 
the GDPR, they are particularly relevant to the last aspect of its operating system to be 
discussed here, the generation of resolutions and decisions by bodies such as the CND, 
ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly.  An important component of treaty evolution, 
arguably it is here where amalgamation of the regime’s operating and normative systems is 
most obvious and Diehl and colleagues’ system ‘nexus’ can be seen.46  This is the case since, 
working within the over-arching principles of the regime framework, resolutions and 
decisions do much to reaffirm or adjust the regime’s normative tone and character. Although 
non-binding, resolutions in particular are considered to have some moral weight.  This is 
particularly so regarding the products of the CND’s ‘Committee of the Whole’ (CoW), the 
technical committee where resolutions are negotiated and agreed upon before being 
submitted to the CND Plenary, and then ECOSOC, for the formality of adoption.47 It is 
consequently in the CoW that on some occasions parties engage in laboured and even heated 
debates and negotiations on specific issues and how they relate to interpretative practice 
around both the letter and the spirit of the treaties.    Considerable diplomatic capital may be 
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invested in this process because interpretations that remain uncontested by other parties 
within the Commission can over time become part of acceptable scope for interpretation and 
shift the regime’s normative focus.48  It is plausible to suggest that the intensity of  
negotiations around not only some CND Resolutions but also more prominent soft law 
instruments such as Political Declarations is in some ways a result of the lack of realistic 
structural modalities for formal revision of the regime.   
On this point, the GDPR is certainly not free from the maxim that treaty interpretation is an 
art not a science.   Utilization of the existing flexibility and ambiguity within the texts has 
over the years permitted a significant number of states increasingly dissatisfied with the 
punitive, and as growing evidence reveals ineffective,49 approach privileged by the 
conventions to engage in a process of what can be called ‘soft defection’.  Rather than 
quitting the regime, utilizing the inherent flexibility within the treaties these states have 
chosen to deviate from its prohibitive norm.  Such an approach creates policy space at the 
national level while allowing the parties to technically remain within the legal boundaries of 
the Conventions.   Since norms are crucial to the essential character of any regime, such a 
process of what should be considered normative attrition represents a form of regime 
transformation.  Crucially, however, in this case the transformation involves regime 
weakening and changes within rather than a more substantive change of the regime. This 
would require a significant alteration in normative focus via formal treaty revision or other 
processes.   
While regime transformation through soft defection can be identified from the early years of 
the contemporary UN regime, it has been especially prominent since the late 1990s. The last 
twenty-years or so have seen a growing number of parties engage with not only the public 
health-oriented harm reduction approach, but also implement the depenalization or 
decriminalization of the possession of drugs for personal use, particularly in relation to 
cannabis, as well as medical marijuana schemes.50 Such a shift has had much to do with an 
improving evidence-base concerning the effectiveness of market interventions, particularly in 
relation to health oriented versus law enforcement dominated approaches. This has also been 
accompanied by an increasing realization of the tension that often exists between drug policy 
and human rights norms and obligations; a tension that is exacerbated by the GDPR.  As 
Barrett and Nowak highlighted in 2009, ‘Unlike human rights law, which focuses to a large 
extent on the protection of the most vulnerable, the drug conventions criminalise specifically 
vulnerable groups.  They criminalise people who use drugs, known to be vulnerable to HIV, 
homelessness, discrimination, violence and premature death…’51  In this regard in particular 
it is difficult to argue with the view that, although the drug control treaties are certainly 
impressive in terms of participation, ‘their operation has been an almost unmitigated failure, 
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producing consequences directly opposite to those envisaged.’52  Paradoxically, while 
legitimizing space for policy plurality at the domestic level, through working within its 
overarching architecture the process of soft defection actually helps to sustain the existing 
operating structures. Moreover, as the Board’s changing interpretative stance on several 
policy choices demonstrates, at a system level the regime has an impressive ability to absorb 
normative shifts.    
2.2 From soft defection to recalibration and breach.  
The process of soft defection and absorption can only go so far, however. While containing 
considerable flexibility, a reading of the treaties, their accompanying commentaries and 
travaux as well as related state practice reveals that the plasticity of the treaty system is not 
infinite.53  Recent years have witnessed the policy choices of several parties, or territories 
therein, reveal not only the regime’s shortcomings in dealing with advances in scientific 
knowledge and international human rights law, but also its suborn resistance to substantive 
change.  The result has been the forced use of extraordinary legal procedures and recourse to 
what can be regarded as unconvincing legal argumentation.  The latter has created a state of 
legal limbo that does little for either the credibility or integrity of the regime and generates 
potential problems for international law well beyond the realms of transnational drug policy.  
As has been well documented elsewhere,54 in an effort to reconcile its international 
obligations under the GDPR with its new constitution, the government of Bolivia moved to 
amend the Single Convention in March 2009 by removing two sub-paragraphs of Article 49 
that bans coca leaf chewing.  This was the first attempt at treaty amendment since 1972.  As 
entitled under the provisions of Article 47, a group of 17 states presented objections within 
the 12-month period established by the procedure and blocked the amendment.55  Having had 
the option for amendment denied, La Paz consequently had little choice but to withdraw from 
the Single Convention, (via Article 46, Denunciation), and re-accede with a reservation, 
pursuant to Article 50 (3).  This is a legitimate although only occasionally used practice 
deployed in the ‘absence of alternative paths to resolve legal conflicts.’56 The success of the 
procedure was predicated on the hope that less than one-third of the parties to the Convention 
would object. Ultimately only 15 countries, considerably short of the necessary 62, rejected 
the move and Bolivia’s re-accession entered into force with its reservation on February 10, 
2013.  This marked the end of an arduous process bringing its coca chewing policy into 
compliance with international law.  
It is not insignificant that efforts to block Bolivia’s proposed amendment to the Single 
Convention were led by the US, a long time and particularly active defender of the GDPR 
and a Party no doubt troubled by policy shifts concerning the recreational use of cannabis. 
Despite, due to the unique character of the issue, the fact that any resultant changes would – 
as has been now shown -  have only a limited direct impact on the US or any of the other 
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objectors, the amendment was opposed on the grounds that it would damage the integrity of 
the regime. An unconvincing legal argument bearing in mind the longstanding and 
widespread practice of coca chewing within parts of Bolivia. Ironically, this position was 
maintained at the same time as the first of a steady trickle of US states moved to create 
regulated markets for the recreational use of cannabis; a policy choice that by all reasonable 
treaty interpretations is not permissible within the current confines of the GDPR.57     
Even though the creation of legally regulated markets for the non-medical and non-scientific 
use of cannabis within a state or any territories thereof represents a clear breach of 
international law, the US Federal government has constructed a legally dubious, but 
politically seductive, argument around dynamic interpretation and treaty flexibility to defend 
the awkward position in which it finds itself.58  A problematic legal justification has also been 
deployed by Uruguay, which in 2012 became the first nation state to pass a bill to legally 
regulate the cannabis market from seed to sale. In the Uruguayan case, however, while 
acknowledging that the treaty system may require ‘a revision and modernization’ at some 
point,59 Montevideo defends its position by referring to the need to respect other legal 
obligations, particularly those regarding human rights principles. These, according to this 
perspective, should always take precedence over drug control in case of any doubt.  
Moreover, the government claims its policy decision is fully in line with the drug control 
treaties’ original objectives, which they have subsequently failed to achieve:  the protection 
of the health and welfare of humankind.60   
Such ‘untidy legal justifications’61 have certainly permitted both the US and Uruguay to 
deflect much criticism concerning what are widely regarded to be breaches of certain treaty 
obligations.  That said, despite justifiable criticism from the INCB and some member states, 
the more widespread calculated political denial that currently pervades the conference rooms 
of Vienna62 is unlikely to remain tenable in the long term. A reluctance to address the 
‘elephant in the room’63 is no doubt the result of a complex mix of factors that go beyond the 
scope of this article, including the particular nature of drug control as an issue area of 
multilateral concern.  Nonetheless, it is plausible to suggest that the existence of this legal 
netherworld can in part be explained by the GDPR’s internal architecture, including its non-
compliance structures.  
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The INCB’s relies primarily on ‘naming and shaming’ what it deems to be errant parties into 
changing their behaviour.64  It is true that the Single Convention allows for some consultation 
in this regard.  According to Article 9 all measures taken by the INCB must be ‘with the 
intent to further the cooperation of Governments with the Board and to provide the 
mechanism for a continuing dialogue between Governments and the Board which will lend 
assistance to and facilitate effective national action to attain the aims’ of the Convention. 
Nonetheless, this structure does not easily allow for or actively encourage more inclusive and 
responsive discussion with other parties and provides little guidance concerning the Board’s 
role in resolving instances of treaty breach beyond the use of Article 14.   Compounding this 
predicament, its formal powers under this Article are limited to recommending an embargo 
on the import and export of drugs to a Party seen to be ‘endangering’ the aims of the Single 
Convention.   This is an inherent paradox within the instrument that demonstrates how its 
prohibition-oriented character generates tensions with the regime’s own overarching goal, 
‘the health and welfare of mankind’. Indeed, Article 14 has never been triggered, although 
some states – notably Afghanistan – have been called to account in line with the mechanism. 
The 1988 Convention is also an exceptional case of a UN treaty that does not have any 
monitoring or review mechanism because the INCB mandate was limited to the precursor 
control regime established under Article 12.  Moreover, for many years the Board benefitted 
from the US’s unofficial and unilateral policing role, including the ‘certification’ and 
‘Presidential determination’ processes.65 Although Washington D.C still flexes its 
considerable diplomatic muscle within the issue area, its own position vis-à-vis regulated 
cannabis markets at the state level puts the US in an awkward position internationally.    
The US stance on cannabis legalization is not inconsequential. It might be argued that if the 
US interpretative position attracted a significant level of political acceptance and became part 
of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, it may open room for manoeuvre.  
Other parties might be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis 
regulation, but for other contested policy options that may emerge.66  Nonetheless, not only 
would such a unilateral ‘a la carte’ approach to multilateral treaty obligations have 
consequences in other issue areas, a key question remains, where would the judgement on the 
use of flexibility lie? As Lines, Barrett and Gallahue presciently argued in 2014, ‘the 
flexibility that the US seeks for itself may not extend to others at all’67; a prediction 
confirmed by US-Jamaican narco-diplomacy in 2015.  Then, in response to early and 
generalised discussions concerning the creation of legal cannabis markets on the island, 
Washington, D.C. strongly opposed any move on the grounds that Jamaica was a transit 
country.68 With such a complex and often contradictory politico-legal environment framing 
discussion - or more accurately stifling discussion - on cannabis at the CND, the future 
remains unclear.   However, the recent decision of the Canadian government to openly admit 
that moves by the Trudeau administration to establish a regulated for market the drug will 
result in the country ‘being in contravention of certain obligations related to cannabis under 
the UN drug conventions’69 seems likely to do much to influence the choices of other states 
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struggling to deal with the structural rigidity of the regime. This is particularly so if, as 
appears to be the case, the state of non-compliance is intended to only be temporary while 
appropriate legal avenues are explored to adjust Canada’s relationship with the regime. As 
the emerging literature on the topic on treaty reform, including other articles in this special 
issue, demonstrates, there are various options available for parties to pursue, each with their 
own advantages and shortcomings.70   
In the foreword to its annual report for 2016, the INCB President stated that while ‘…some 
actors will continue to talk about the need to “modernize” the treaties and their provisions; 
INCB is of the view that the international drug control system continues to provide a modern 
and flexible structure that can meet the world’s drug control needs for today and tomorrow.’71 
In so doing, despite growing challenges to such a perspective,72  the Board dismisses the 
concept of regime evolution and modernization and the fact that substantive structural change 
does take place in other issue areas.  Examples can be found in a range of other contemporary 
transnational issues of concern.  This includes the global anti-money laundering regime based 
around the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC or Palermo 
Convention) and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), both of which build upon 
provisions within the 1988 Convention.73 Another example can be found within the realm of 
international trade policy. As the transition from the regime based around the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a system emerging from the same post war 
environment as the GDPR, to the World Trade Organisation demonstrates, evolution is not 
always smooth.74  This was the case even amidst a widespread realization among parties that 
the GATT was ‘no longer as relevant to the realities of world trade as it had been in the 
1940s.’75  Yet, clearly change can and does occur. Within the context of this discussion, 
however, it is instructive to examine the modernization of the regime for environmental 
regulation.   While it would be unwise to attempt to draw direct parallels between the two 
regimes, a specific focus on some of the mechanisms within a selection of its MEAs reveals 
the dynamic nature of a truly modern regime.  
 
3. Regime change and modernization in the environmental regime 
 
In contrast to the GDPR and its poor alignment with international human rights law, the 
regime for environmental regulation has been exemplified by a robust evolution of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements the structures of which allows for taking into account 
the development of International Environmental Law (IEL); defined as ‘substantive, 
procedural and institutional rules of international law that have their primary objective the 
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protection of the environment’.76  As Schiele has pointed out, ‘While MEAs are multilateral 
treaties concluded under international law and may therefore be mistaken for static legal 
instruments, they frequently provide for the establishment of an institutional apparatus and 
specific processes which allow for their constant dynamic evolution’.77  
With the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) a ‘particularly important organization in the 
evolution of conventions and instruments in the field of environmental protection’78 the 
environmental regime and the instruments of which it is comprised are unique in the way that 
they incorporate fast changing IEL and its principles. For example, even older MEAs such as 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Trade of Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora 
(CITES), which at its inception was essentially a trade convention, has evolved over time to 
acquire an ecological dimension.  This brought it into line with purely ecological MEAs such 
as the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.  Such an evolutionary process was possible 
through the adoption by CITES’ governing body of a decision to incorporate into the 
Convention the precautionary principle; a new principle underlying IEL that aims to provide 
guidance in the development and application of International Environmental Law where there 
is scientific uncertainty.79  Indeed, there are several characteristics of MEAs that allow for 
such flexibility and the possibility of adjusting treaties to consider changing scientific 
knowledge and development of IEL.  
First, and key among these, is the form of the governance structure of MEAs.  Rather than a 
limited membership functional commission of ECOSOC, or officially the Council itself, as is 
the case with the GDPR, the highest decision-making body of MEAs is the Conference of the 
Parties (COPs), in some instances called the Meeting of the Parties (MOPs).80 All states that 
are Parties to a convention are represented at the COP where they regularly and explicitly 
review treaty implementation and take decisions necessary to promote their effective 
operation.  
 
The first MEA which established a form of COP was the 1971 Ramsar Convention on 
Wetlands of International Importance.  Another example from the same era is the London 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution in 1972.  Although the COP within both 
instruments possessed limited power, Schielle points out that the first MEA to establish a 
‘modern’ COP with more comprehensive powers was CITES.  Indeed, ‘all three conventions 
were negotiated under the auspices of the UNEP, which implies that a learning process with 
the gradual evolution of the modern concept of a COP took place.’81  Treaties subsequently 
negotiated under UNEP also establish a modern COP with far-reaching competences.82 There 
remains some debate surrounding the precise power of COPs.  Nonetheless, there is general 
agreement that, among other things including performing an important and regularized 
reviewing function, the organs are ‘responsible for the dynamic evolution of MEAs, 
providing permanent fora for their further development and revision’.83  
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Following the steps set out in the MEA and the rules of procedure, a COP adopts legally 
binding or non-binding decisions containing further commitments of parties.  ‘This function’, 
it has been noted, ‘establishes a more effective alternative to ad hoc diplomatic conferences 
negotiating specific issues’.  It is also important to note that COPs are cheaper than in terms 
of cost.84  Discussion exists concerning precisely how COPs differ to diplomatic conference 
and on this point Brunnée sees them ‘hybrids between issue-specific diplomatic conferences 
and the permanent plenary bodies of international organizations,’ pointing out that ‘…there 
has been considerable interest in shifting patterns in MEA-based law-making processes, 
prompted in large measure by the sense that conventional processes are too sluggish to 
produce timely responses to global environmental decline.’ 85   
Second, and of considerable importance, is the integration within the structure of MEAs of 
formalized and permanent technical and expert bodies that act in an advisory capacity to the 
COPs and are especially well equipped to deal with various aspects of the agreements’ areas 
of concern. This contrasts with the GDPR where there is arguably limited opportunity for 
discussion of scientific advances and improvements in understanding, particularly with the 
traditional – although now changing - marginalization of the WHO within the drug control 
regime.  Within the realm of MEAs, the centrality of expertise is not a particularly recent 
innovation. Even the 70-year-old International Whaling Commission (IWC), consisting of 
Commissioners representing all State parties to the 1946 International Convention of the 
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) has a very well-developed structure consisting of three main 
committees, prominent among those the Scientific Committee.   
Third, the legal structure of some MEAs allows for the incorporation of far-reaching changes.  
These include provisions, called ‘enabling clauses’, which defer to future decisions of the 
COPs certain developments or a clarification of a treaty regime.  These have been described 
as ‘in general giving a specific mandate to the Conference of the Parties…to elaborate (more 
detailed) rules in a particular area without providing for specific amendment procedure.’86  
Within this context, as will be discussed, compliance procedures play an important role.  As 
Klabbers notes, they ‘may well be considered as integral parts of the institutionalization of 
international environmental law.’ Further, he points out, ‘the procedures tend to be non-
adversarial in nature, tend to not focus on “breach” but on “non-compliance” and tend to 
result in making recommendations to the parties as to how to assist the state in non-
compliance.’87 In the following sections we offer a brief examination of specific MEAs to 
highlight some of these features, as well as other relevant mechanisms pertaining to dynamic 
evolution.  
3.1 The 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) 
Annually, international wildlife trade is estimated to be worth billions of dollars and to 
include hundreds of millions of plant and animal specimens. The trade is diverse, ranging 
from live animals and plants to a vast array of wildlife products derived from them, including 
food products, exotic leather goods, wooden musical instruments, timber, tourist curios and 
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medicines.88   One of the oldest and most expansive MEAs currently in existence, CITES 
accords varying degrees of protection to more than 35,000 species of animals and plants, 
whether they are traded as live specimens, fur coats or dried herbs. The species covered by 
the Convention are listed in three Appendices, according to the degree of protection they 
need. The decision-making body for CITES is the COP, which is established in Article 11 of 
the Convention.  The Convention’s Secretariat is administered by the UNEP, as laid down in 
Article 11 (1). Between the regular meetings of the COP the Standing Committee oversees 
implementation. For scientific issues the Conference of the Parties established an Animals 
Committee and a Plants Committee. 
Indeed, CITES is one of the MEAs which has evolved the most through the resolutions of the 
COP. As noted above, as a trade convention signed in early 1970s, it was not originally based 
on any ecological principles. However, it evolved on the basis of COP resolutions such as 
Conf. 9.24 (COP15) that adopted the precautionary principle. CITES is also very flexible as 
parties can take out a ‘reservation’ on species listings, in which case they are treated as a non-
Party to the Convention with respect to that species until their reservation is withdrawn.  
Like other MEAs, CITES has also developed a strict non-compliance procedure (NCP). As 
an example of the Convention’s ability to change substantively over time, the establishment 
of the NCP followed developments in the Montreal Protocol.89   The main organ in charge of 
non-compliance is the Standing Committee which advises on measures to the COP. There are 
several measures that can be adopted in cases of non-compliance, with national reports that 
are subject to in-depth review by the special organs at the heart of the process.  
3.2 The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer  
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (MP), a Protocol to the 
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, was designed to reduce the 
production and consumption of ozone depleting substances to diminish their abundance in the 
atmosphere, and thereby protect the earth’s fragile ozone layer. The original Montreal 
Protocol was signed on 16 September 1987 and entered into force on 1 January 1989. The 
instrument is considered a success story.  The UNEP has predicted that the ozone layer 
should be back to its pre-1980 levels and condition between 2050 and 2075.  
Crucially, the legal and organisational structure of the MP is designed to respond to new 
scientific discoveries and consequently act in a rapid manner. It has a classical amendment 
procedure, which means ratification by the parties of the Protocol as laid out in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The MP was amended four times to enable, 
among other things, the control of new chemicals and the creation of a financial mechanism 
to enable developing countries to comply. Specifically, the Second, Fourth, Ninth and 
Eleventh MOPs to the Montreal Protocol adopted, in accordance with the procedure laid 
down in paragraph 4 of Article 40 of the VCLT, four Amendments to the Protocol; 
the London Amendment (1990), the Copenhagen Amendment (1992), the Montreal 
Amendment (1997) and the Beijing Amendment (1999).  Through amendment the Montreal 
Protocol also included explicitly the precautionary principle in its provisions, thus keeping 
abreast with the developments in environmental law. 
Changes in the MP, under Article 2(9), also introduced a new procedure of adjustments, 
which may concern a tightening up of the elimination procedure. This provision thus enables 
the parties to the MP to adopt decisions which, in the event of not reaching consensus, are 
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taken on the basis of a majority vote that then bind all parties.   This is a revolutionary 
provision, which develops the original Protocol.  
In addition to adjustments and amendments to the MP, the MOP to the Protocol meet 
annually and take a variety of decisions aimed at enabling effective implementation of this 
important legal instrument. By the 22nd MOP in 2010 the parties had taken over 
720 decisions.     
One of the most important achievements of the MP relative to this discussion, however, is the 
establishment of the Non-Compliance Procedure.  It is worth noting that the NCP was 
adopted by the Decision of the MOP on the basis of the so-called ‘enabling clause’ of the MP 
in Article 8: ‘The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve procedures and 
institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol 
and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance.’  As such, it was not adopted on 
the basis of the MP itself.  Rather, a permanent NCP was adopted at MOP-4 (1992). It has the 
Implementation Committee as the body to receive and consider reports of non-compliance. 
Non-compliant parties are given notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond. The 
Committee must report any recommendations to the MOP. The permanent non-compliance 
mechanism was reviewed and amended at MOP-10. The amendments, inter alia, required the 
Implementation Committee to report persistent patterns of non-compliance to the MOP and 
make appropriate recommendations to maintain the integrity of the Protocol.  
The MP is the first MEA to incorporate multilaterally determined penalties into its range of 
non-compliance responses.  However, it is vital to stress that although containing provisions 
for sanctioning non-compliant states, the central aim of the NCP is to provide assistance.  The 
punishment component can be considered as little more than a sideshow. As Yoshida notes, 
‘Compared with traditional judicial settlements that usually require time-consuming 
processes, the NCP regime seems more flexible, simple and rapid.’  Moreover, ‘In light of the 
step-by-step negotiation process of the NCP regime, which seeks feasible and amicable 
solutions, the international mechanism shows a scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of 
ozone regime member states.’90 
3.3 The 1998 UN European Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the 
Aarhus Convention)  
The Aarhus Convention is a new kind of environmental agreement. It ‘establishes a number 
of rights of the public (individuals and their associations) with regard to the environment.’ 
Moreover, parties to the Convention are required to make the necessary provisions so that 
public authorities (at national, regional or local level) will contribute to these rights to 
become effective. The Convention provides for the ‘right of everyone to receive 
environmental information that is held by public authorities, ‘the right to participate in 
environmental decision-making’ and the ‘right to review procedures to challenge public 
decisions’ that have been made without respecting these two rights or ‘environmental rights 
in general.’91 As such, the subject of the Convention goes to the heart of the relationship 
between people and governments. The Convention is not only an environmental agreement, 
with for example its implementation of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration (the procedure for 
environmental rights), it is also a Convention about government accountability, transparency 
and responsiveness.   Speaking as the instrument came into force in 2001, the UN Secretary-
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General, Kofi-Annan, stated that ‘The Aarhus Convention is the most ambitious venture in 
environmental democracy undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations.’92  For Mary 
Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, it represented a 
‘remarkable achievement not only in terms of protection of the environment, but also in terms 
of the promotion and protection of human rights.’ ‘[I]t is truly a trailblazer’, she said.93  
Beyond these ‘trailblazing’ high-order principles, however, the Convention also contains 
many important general features. Namely, it adopts a rights-based approach, it is a ‘floor’ not 
a ‘ceiling’ in terms of minimum standards, it prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship, nationality or domicile against persons seeking to exercise their rights under the 
Convention and it has a wide definition of public authorities. Further, like the MP, the MOP 
is the Convention’s main governing body.  In its meetings, other Signatories and other States 
as well as intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations participate as observers.94 
Crucially, the mandate of the MOP is to keep under continuous review the implementation of 
the Convention and take the necessary measures required to achieve the purposes of the 
Convention. 
Similarly, as with the MP’s assessment panels that were established and approved at its first 
MOP in 1989, several other organs of the Convention have been established by the Aarhus 
Convention MOP since the instrument came into force.  For example, a ‘Working Group of 
Parties’ has been set up to oversee the implementation of the work programme for the 
Convention between meetings of the parties.  This is ‘the same composition’ as the MOP 
itself but meets more regularly.95 Other Convention bodies include the Bureau of the Meeting 
(elected at the MOP in 2014), the Task Force on Access to Justice (established at the first 
MOP in 2002), the Task Force on Public Participation (adopted at the 2010 MOP) and the 
Task Force on Access to Information (established by the MOP in 2011).   
Arguably the greatest success of the Aarhus Convention, however, is its Compliance 
Committee. Article 15 of the Convention on review of compliance, required the Meeting of 
the Parties to establish ‘optional arrangements of a non-confrontational, non-judicial and 
consultative nature for reviewing compliance with the provisions of the Convention’, that is 
to say through the ‘enabling clause’. Following this obligation, the Meeting of the Signatories 
established a Working Group to prepare such a mechanism. At its first session (October 
2002), the MOP adopted Decision I/7 on review of compliance and elected the first 
Compliance Committee.   
The parties consequently now regularly address issues of compliance based on the 
Committee's reports. The Compliance mechanism can be triggered in several ways including 
by a party making a submission about its own compliance.96 At the Committee's 
recommendation, it adopts decisions on general issues of compliance and also decisions on 
compliance by individual parties.97 The Compliance Committee is a crucial interface between 
the public and the parties and underpins the openness and transparency of the Convention. 
Writing in 2007, Koester noted that experience with the mechanism ‘so far demonstrates that 
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it is possible to deal with compliance issues in an open and transparent manner.’98  It is a 
unique mechanism built into the Convention, ensuring that it is continuously under review 
and that the Convention's parties are in compliance with its provisions.  
 
4. Concluding remarks  
It is axiomatic that ‘Circumstances do not stay static once a treaty has entered into force.’99 
Yet, as we have discussed in the preceding pages, not all regimes have the same capacity to 
evolve and modernise in response to those changing situations.  Indeed, relative to the MEAs 
discussed here, and the environmental regime of which they are a part more generally, the 
treaties underpinning the GDPR display a resistance to adapt to not only the changing 
requirements of some Parties, but also advances in scientific knowledge and international 
human rights law that often underpin policy shifts at the national level. Although normative 
adjustments taking place within the extant framework via ‘soft defection’ have permitted a 
degree of modernization, structural impediments to go further are placing the regime into an 
increasingly awkward state of limbo. A combination of factors, prominent among them 
governance structures and monitoring-review and non-compliance mechanisms, has led to a 
remarkably homeostatic system and a situation that arguably puts the integrity and credibility 
of the GDPR at risk; a condition that chimes with Diehl, Ku and Zamora’s view that where 
the operating system does not respond to normative changes ‘suboptimal legal arrangements’ 
result.100 This state of affairs will no doubt provoke different reactions depending upon one’s 
view of the regime’s prohibitive-orientation.  Nonetheless, it is important not to ignore the 
central role it plays - although not always efficiently - in ensuring access to drugs for medical 
and scientific purposes.  
In contrast, as useful examples of dynamic MEAs, the three Agreements discussed here 
clearly indicate that successful and relevant regimes must possess the capacity to evolve. 
Unlike the suite of drug control conventions that in many respects appear designed to 
maintain the status quo, CITES, the MP and the Aarhus Convention all have evolutionary 
capacity built into their very DNA. It is important to stress that within the realm of 
environmental regulation the mechanisms for change are in the main predicated on a 
tightening of the regime in line with advances in scientific knowledge and IEL. Nonetheless, 
it is instructive to move beyond the Vienna drug control silo and draw lessons from other 
parts of the UN system and beyond where dynamism is more representative of regime 
operation.    
As discussed, a key mechanism for evolution of MEAs is via resolutions and decisions of the 
COPs/MOPs that are guided and assisted by the specialist bodies of the Agreements. In fact, 
the provisions of environmental conventions have evolved so greatly through such decisions 
that the original text only provides a very general framework. These conventions have the 
original legal tool of decision-making to update the text without recourse to a cumbersome 
procedure of amendment. Lack within the GDPR of both COPs to the treaties and specialist 
scientific bodies with a genuine capacity to review implementation in line with the ‘health 
and welfare’ of humankind arguably exemplifies its Jurassic character.   
Distinct to MEA’s, there is no forum where all the parties can, on a regular basis, engage in a 
process of substantive treaty review and easily discuss and move to resolve challenges to the 
regime deriving from divergent approaches among them. Had this been the case perhaps the 
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current dilemmas around cannabis, including a politically calculated state of denial among 
many member states,101 might have been avoided or at least managed more satisfactorily.  
This is a point of concern as more states appear to be seriously considering following, in one 
way or another, Uruguay and Canada in their approach to the substance. As a reading of the 
Single Convention reveals, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs does not have an explicit 
mandate for treaty review.102 This is derived indirectly, and in a generalised form, from the 
1946 ECOSOC resolution establishing the Commission.103 Yet, as a reading of official CND 
reports reveal, attention is only given to treaty implementation. Furthermore, even when 
debates move decennially - or thereabouts - beyond the conference rooms of Vienna for high-
level reviews fundamental pressures invariably remain outside the scope of deliberations. It is 
certainly telling that discussion of the tensions thrown up by regulated cannabis markets was 
studiously ignored in New York at the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session on the 
World Drug Problem.104  It is important to highlight here that recourse through ECOSOC to a 
plenary conference to discuss amendment of a drug control treaty is likely to be opposed by 
many member states due to the additional financial costs involved.105   
It is plausible to suggest that the form of the current GDPR structures can be explained as a 
legacy issue. The Single Convention after all inherited much of its internal apparatus from 
conventions dating to the pre-UN era.  It is interesting to note, however, that despite the 
incorporation of COPs within instruments in other parts of the UN system in the early 1970s, 
for example CITES, the mechanism for review does not seem to have been considered during 
discussion for the 1972 Amending Protocol. Instead, the power of the INCB was bolstered. 
The legacy argument might also be applied in relation to the systemic disconnect between 
drug control and human rights; a situation that led Paul Hunt, the former Special Rapporteur 
on the right to the highest attainable standard of health to conclude that ‘[i]t is imperative that 
the international drug control system . . . and the complex international human rights system 
that has evolved since 1948, cease to behave as though they exist in parallel universes.’106 
Regarding the operation of the INCB, there are clearly some similarities between its role 
within the GDPR to monitor and encourage compliance and that of NCPs within MEAs.  For 
example, they both rely heavily on ‘naming and shaming’ in public fora and have limited 
realistic options concerning powers of sanction.  That said, despite some mandated guidance 
on the Board’s cooperation and constant dialogue with parties, NCPs within MEAs appear to 
be constructed more in terms of problem resolution and discussion among all parties; a 
process that again takes place through the COP. The suggestion here is not that NCPs should 
be transferred to the GDPR wholesale from MEAs, or indeed other treaty frameworks.  The 
approach to non-compliance must clearly be tailored to suit the issue area. However, it seems 
fair to conclude that lessons can be learned from other issue area regimes, particularly in 
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relation to the creation of venues for discussion.  Indeed, pressure is mounting on the INCB 
to adopt a more constrictive position and move beyond the current ‘treaties say no’ approach 
to the current dilemma. This does not help states grappling with complex legal questions.  
Furthermore, that states like Uruguay and Canada, and at the subnational level, the US 
continue to engage with or plan for regulated cannabis markets in the face of condemnation 
does little for the Board’s authority.     
At an operating system level, a genuine de-Jurassifcation of the GDPR clearly requires 
considerable effort. Nonetheless, such endeavour seems worthy of consideration in the 
context of the changing national level drug policy landscape and the resultant tensions 
generated between domestic legislation and international law.  Although the issue of cannabis 
regulation is currently highlighting systemic shortcomings, it is unlikely to be the last 
challenge to the existing prohibition-oriented UN drug control architecture.107   Extraordinary 
options such as unilateral denunciation with re-accession and reservation may allow an 
individual state to realign national policy with international obligations under the drug control 
treaties. Yet, such a piecemeal approach will do little to help modernize the regime to the 
point where it will allow for continuous changes in approach across a range of currently 
prohibited substances. Moreover, such processes are unlikely to act as catalysts for necessary 
systemic shifts to bring international drug control into line with international human rights 
law,108 or, within an era where international law is increasingly fragmented, other obligations 
derived from what can be usefully understood as intersecting regime complexes.109 Amongst 
other suggestions for structural change,110 for the long-term operation of the regime it is 
certainly worth considering the integration of COPs111 and investigating their potential 
comparative advantages over functional commissions.  This could be the first stage in an 
incremental process whereby parties to the drug control treaties could begin to discuss 
structural evolution that allowed for differentiated engagement according to their own 
circumstances, contingent of course on adherence to certain human rights standards.   In the 
shorter term, or perhaps in parallel, engagement by a group of like-minded states with the 
option of modification inter se among themselves appears to be a promising route towards the 
facilitation of what Boister has called ‘a multispeed drug control system’112 operating within 
the boundaries of international law.  And here again a Conference of the Parties mechanism 
may have a useful role to play.  In this case it would be in the form of a Conference of the 
Inter Se Parties (COISP) to regularly review the agreements and enable further evolution 
based on lessons learned, and in particular to prevent violation of the rights of the other 
parties in the principal conventions.113  
The suggestion of integrating COPs in one way or another is not as farfetched as it might at 
first appear.  This is particularly so since, in addition to possessing their own ECOSOC 
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mandated functional commission,114 closely related UN conventions already incorporate this 
mechanism for regular treaty review. Both the 2000 UNTOC and the 2003 UNCAC contain 
inbuilt provisions for a ‘Conference of the Parties to the Convention’; Articles 32 and 62 
respectively.  Moreover, the former includes provision for the addition of new instruments to 
create ‘a system that can easily be supplemented by additional protocols in the future which 
may then focus on other specific, maybe new, upcoming areas of transnational organised 
crime.’ 115 The UNTOC, which like all the drug treaties not only falls under the remit of the 
UNODC but is also conceptually linked to the drug control treaties – and built upon the 1988 
Convention specifically - 116 was seen to break new ground in this regard. Writing in 2004, 
Clark noted ‘Article 32 of the Transnational Crime Convention is innovative procedurally in 
the international criminal law area.’117 COPs, as experience in international crime control and 
elsewhere including MEAs reveals, should not be considered a silver bullet. Problems 
abound. Nonetheless, they, and related scientific and other committees and advisory bodies 
that come with them, could be a rewarding area of further study in relation to drug policy.  As 
the late Harvard Law Professor and International Court of Justice Judge Richard R. Baxter 
wrote in 1980, ‘The lawyer is indeed a social engineer and in that role, he must be able to 
invent or produce machinery that will assist in the resolution of disputes and differences 
between states.  He must be prepared to fine-tune the law, to exploit its capacity for adaption 
to the needs of the parties and to promote movement and change’.118  Within the complex and 
cross cutting field of international drug policy, the same might be said for IR scholars, 
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